Compact Online Reference Encyclopedia (CORE)

Looking for information on a specific topic, training, rule, or process? Through one search here, you can find the information you need from ICAOS’ white papersadvisory opinions, bylaws, policies, Hearing Officer's Guidetraining modulesrules, helpdesk articles and the bench book. All results are cross-referenced with links to make navigation easy and intuitive.

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Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor other formulations of sovereign immunity bar a suit against a state in the courts of another state. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Mianecki v. Second Judicial Court of Washoe County, 658 P.2d 422 (Nev. 1983),…
Judges have absolute immunity from liability as long as they are performing a judicial act and there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). A judge is not deprived of absolute immunity from liability for…
Like judges, prosecutors have absolute immunity from lawsuits seeking money damages. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1986). That immunity allows prosecutors to exercise the independence of judgment essential to their work—and to avoid the deluge of…
Government officials sued in their individual capacity have what is known as qualified immunity from suits for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person…
Some states recognize the so-called public duty doctrine—the idea that a government official has no legal duty to protect an individual citizen from harm caused by a third person. The rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and a refusal…
The Compact necessarily involves offenders moving across state lines. Therefore, considerations of different courts’ personal jurisdiction over the parties to a suit might come into play. Unfortunately, different courts have reached different results when…
Determining offender eligibility under the Compact requires a multi-prong analysis beginning with the broad definition of offender. An “offender” means “an adult placed under, or made subject to, supervision as a result of the commission of a criminal…
According the Commission’s definition of “offender,” the Commission can regulate the full range of adult offenders. An adult offender does not have to be on a traditionally applied formal “probation” or “parole” status to qualify for transfer and…
Transfers fall into one of two categories, (1) mandatory acceptance and (2) discretionary acceptance. The authority to place an offender outside the state rests exclusively with the sending state. See Rule 3.101. The offender has no constitutional right…
Rule 3.101-1 addresses three categories of military individuals: (1) military personnel, (2) family members living with military personnel; and (3) veterans for medical or mental health services. Military Personnel are eligible for reporting instructions…
The other circumstances in which a receiving state is mandated to accept supervision include the employment transfer of an offender and the employment transfer of a family member with whom the offender resides with to another state. Rule 3.101-1(a)(3) and…
An offender not subject to the ICAOS is not eligible to have their supervision transferred to another state, but neither are they restricted in their travel, except as otherwise ordered by the sentencing court. See Sanchez v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 845 A.…
The ICAOS applies to all offenders meeting the eligibility requirements and who are subject to some form of community supervision or corrections. By design, the term “offender” provides greater scope and flexibility in the management of offender…
In addition to traditional cases where an offender is formally adjudicated and placed on supervision, the ICAOS also applies in so-called “suspended sentencing,” “suspended adjudication,” and “deferred sentencing” contexts. Rule 2.106 provides that “…
Some states may use a “sentencing” option referred to as deferred prosecution. Such sentences, which are generally authorized by a state’s statutes, allow the offender to admit under oath or stipulate to the facts of the criminal conduct, but defer…
Particular attention should be paid to offenders convicted of a second or subsequent offense of driving while impaired (DUI and DWI offenses). Because various states’ laws differ widely on what constitutes a second or subsequent conviction, the Commission…
One area for potential confusion centers on the issue of treatment in lieu of supervision or treatment as supervision. In such cases, courts may be inclined to defer sentence and require enrollment in a community based or in-house treatment program in…
Initiating the Transfer Process
The rules of the Commission can have significant impact on the time between final disposition of a case and when the offender can actually move to another state. To the extent that an offender is eligible for transfer under the Compact, a court does not…
Through its rules, the Commission allows an “expedited” option, which effectively allows the offender to transfer supervision on a “pending acceptance” basis. To qualify for expedited reporting instructions, the sending and receiving state must agree that…
The Commission adopted Rule 3.103 to address those offenders subject to probation who need to relocate to a state prior to acceptance and receiving reporting instructions. This rule allows an offender who is living in the receiving state at the time of…
An offender who is otherwise eligible for transfer under Rule 3.101 may not be required to submit to psychological testing by the receiving state as a condition of acceptance of the transfer. Such “pre-acceptance” requirements imposed on otherwise…
Although receiving states may not impose pre-acceptance requirements on offenders that would violate a state’s obligations under the Compact, the Compact and its rules would not prevent the receiving state from imposing post-acceptance testing…
The Commission recognizes that the transfer of sex offenders is complex due to individual state laws regarding sex offender registries and various residency and employment restrictions. Rule 3.101-3 addresses these challenges in order to promote offender…
Supervision in the Receiving State
In interpreting the ICAOS and its rules, eligibility to transfer supervision is controlled by the nature of the offense, the nature of the sentence and the status of the offender, not the duration of supervision (as distinguished from the amount of…
While the sending state has sole authority to determine the duration of supervision either by way of the court’s sentence of by paroling authorities, the receiving state retains discretion as to the type of supervision it will provide. Rule 4.101…
A receiving state is obligated to continue to supervise offenders “who become mentally ill or exhibit signs of mental illness or who develop a physical disability while supervised in the receiving state.” See Rule 2.108. Therefore, it would be…
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