Courts have generally upheld the application of sex offender registration requirements to individuals whose supervision transfers under the Interstate Compact, provided those requirements are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. A receiving state may require a transferred individual to comply with its sex offender registration laws so long as the requirements imposed are the same as those applied to similarly situated in-state sex offenders.
In Doe v. McVey, 381 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2005) aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2008)3, the court invalidated the application of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law to an out-of-state sex offender where the statute required automatic community notification for transferees but afforded in-state sex offenders a civil hearing to determine sexually violent predator status. The court held that imposing heightened registration consequences on out-of-state sex offenders without equivalent procedural protections violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Consistent with this principle, ICAOS Rules 4.101 and 4.103 require receiving states to supervise in a manner consistent with similarly situated in-state individuals. While a receiving state may enforce its registration requirements, it may not impose additional or more burdensome requirements solely because the individual was convicted in another state.
3This decision interpreted the former Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole (ICPP). The ICAOS replaced the ICPP in 2002, but courts continue to look to ICPP case law where its reasoning is consistent with the current Compact’s structure and purpose.