Principal among the provisions of the ICAOS are the waiver of formal extradition requirements for returning supervised individuals who violate the terms and condition of their supervision. Article I of the ICAOS specifically provides that:
The Compacting states recognize that there is no “right” of any supervised individual to live in another state and that duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any offender under supervision subject to the provisions of this compact and By-laws and Rules promulgated hereunder.
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 3.109, a supervised individual is required to waive extradition as a condition of transferring supervision. That rule provides:
(a) A supervised individual applying for interstate supervision shall execute, at the time of application for transfer, a waiver of extradition from any state to which the individual may abscond while under supervision in the receiving state; and,
(b) States that are parties to this compact waive all legal requirements to extradition of supervised individuals who are fugitives from justice.
It is important to note that, under certain requirements, a sending state retains the authority to enter a receiving state and retake a supervised individual. See infra, at § 5.8 concerning hearing requirements. The waiver of extradition outlined in Rule 3.109 applies to any member state where the supervised individual might be located. Under Rule 3.109, authorities are not limited in their pursuit of fugitives or in returning a fugitive to the sending state. However, authorities may be required to present evidence that the fugitive is the person sought and that they are acting with lawful authority, e.g., they are lawful agents of the state enforcing a properly issued warrant. See Ogden v. Klundt, 550 P.2d 36, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
Although Article I of the ICAOS and Rule 3.109 have not been extensively analyzed in reported appellate decisions, courts have consistently upheld similar waiver provisions contained in prior compacts. Challenges to extradition waivers under the former Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole were unsuccessful, with courts concluding that such waivers did not violate due process. See Gulley v. Apple, 210 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Ark. 1948); Woods v. State, 87 So.2d 633 (Ala. 1956); Ex parte Tenner, 128 P.2d 338, 638 (Cal. 1942); Louisiana v. Aronson, 252 A.2d 733, 734–35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969); People ex rel. Rankin v. Ruthazer, 107 N.E.2d 458, 461 (N.Y.1952); Pierce v. Smith, 195 P.2d 112, 116–17 (Wash. 1948). Even in the absence of a written waiver by the supervised individual, extradition is not available, as the ICPP operates to waive any extradition rights. See People v. Bynul, 524 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). Habeas corpus is generally unavailable to supervised individuals being held pending return to the sending state under an interstate Compact. See Stone v. Robinson, 69 So. 2d 206 (Miss. 1954) (prisoner not in Mississippi as a matter of right but as a matter of grace under the clemency extended by the Louisiana parole board; prisoner subject to being retaken on further action by the parole board); State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 240 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1974) (constitutional rights of a supervised individual with supervision transferred under the Compact are not violated by the denial of an extradition hearing, as the individual is not an absconder but is in another state by permission and therefore subject to the retaking provisions of the Compact); Cook v. Kern, 330 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964) (whatever benefits the supervised individual enjoys under the Texas extradition statute, he has not been deprived of a federally protected right and therefore a writ of habeas corpus is properly denied; even assuming that involvement of a constitutional right, the parole agreement constitutes a sufficient waiver.) However, a person seeking relief from incarceration imposed as the result of allegedly invalid proceedings under the ICPP may utilize the remedy of habeas corpus to challenge that incarceration. E.g., People v. Velarde, 739 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1987). Other jurisdictions have also recognized the availability of this remedy, albeit for limited issues, to supervised individuals seeking to challenge the nature and result of proceedings conducted pursuant to provisions equivalent to those of the ICPP. E.g., United States ex rel. Simmons v. Lohman, 228 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1955); Petition of Mathews, 247 N.E.2d 791 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Ex Parte Cantrell, 362 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1962). The availability of habeas corpus to a detained supervised individual may also be affected by recent changes to the ICAOS rules imposing time limits on probable cause determinations. See Rule 5.108(b) & (f).