The courts have defined the relationship between the sending state and receiving state officials as an agency relationship. Courts recognize that in supervising out-of-state supervised individuals the receiving state acts on behalf of and as an agent of the sending state. See State v. Hill, 334 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1983) (trial court erred in granting bail to an out-of-state supervised individual, as the individual’s status was not controlled by the domestic law of Iowa, but rather by the Interstate Compact for Probation and Parole and the determinations of sending state authorities); State ex rel.Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio, 610 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“For purposes of determining appellee’s status in the present case, we believe that the Ohio authorities should be considered as agents of Pennsylvania, the sending state. As such, the Ohio authorities are bound by the decision of Pennsylvania with respect to whether the apprehended probationer should be considered for release on bond and the courts of Ohio should recognize that fact.”); See also New York v. Orsino, 27 Misc.3d 1218(A), 2010 WL 1797026 (N.Y.Sup., April 26, 2010)(“In several cases both appellate and lower courts have held that the power of the receiving state, in this case Connecticut, to conduct a hearing is delegated to it pursuant to the Compact for Adult Supervision.”); People ex rel Ortiz v. Johnson, 122 Misc.2d 816, Sup. Ct.1984).

In supervising out-of-state supervised individuals, authorities in a receiving state do not act exclusively as authorities under the domestic law of that state, but also act as agents of the sending state and, to a certain degree, are controlled by the lawful decisions of sending state officials. Under the terms of the Compact, the receiving state “will assume the duties of visitation and supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state.” While the receiving state assumes the obligation to monitor probationers, the sending state does not abdicate its responsibility. See Johnson v. State, 957 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. App. 2011); Keeney v. Caruthers, 861 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. App. 2007); Scott v. Virginia, 676 S.E.2d 343, 348 (Va. App. 2009).

The arrest of an out-of-state supervised individual can fall under three broad categories. First, such an individual is clearly subject to arrest and detention for committing a new offense in the receiving state. Rules 5.101, 5.101-1, and 5.102 acknowledge that a supervised individual may be held in a receiving state for committing a crime and is not subject to retaking unless the receiving state consents, the term of incarceration for the new crime is completed, or the supervised individual has been placed on probation. The authority to incarcerate a supervised individual inherently includes the authority to arrest them for committing an offense.

Second, an out-of-state supervised individual is subject to arrest and detention upon request of the sending state if it intends to retake the individual. This can occur either at the demand of the receiving state or because the sending state intends to revoke probation. Under this circumstance, upon notification to retake the individual, the sending state must issue a warrant and file a detainer with the holding facility when the individual is in custody. Courts have consistently recognized the right of a receiving state to arrest and detain a supervised individual based on such a request from a sending state. See e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio, 610 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (supervised individual cannot be admitted to bail pending retaking); Crady v. Cranfill, 371 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (detention of supervised individuals is proper as only courts in the sending state can determine the status of their jurisdiction over the individual).

The third circumstance in which officials in the receiving state can arrest an out-of-state supervised individual is for violations that occur physically in the receiving state. This third circumstance may prove to be the most confusing and difficult, given the supervised individual may or may not face charges for a new offense in the receiving state, and the sending state may or may not initiate retaking proceedings. Nevertheless, courts have recognized that out-of-state supervised individuals are subject to arrest for violations that occur in the receiving state. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Longsworth, 107 F.3d 870 (Table), 1997 WL 76190 (6th Cir. 1997) (out-of-state probationer could not show that he was entitled to be released from detention under the standards set by Ohio for its own probationers and parolees) (Emphasis added); in accord, Perry v. Pennsylvania, 2008 WL 2543119 (W.D. Pa. 2008)

The ICAOS rules clarify the arrest powers of state officials supervising an out-of-state supervised individual. Rule 4.109-1 provides that, “A supervised individual in violation of the conditions of supervision may be taken into custody or continued in custody in the receiving state.” This rule acts as statutory authorization in the receiving state notwithstanding domestic laws to the contrary. See, Art. V (Commission to adopt rules that “shall have the effect of statutory law” and are binding on the states). Rule 4.109-1 effectively adopts and codifies the Commission’s prior stance on arrest powers as set out in ICAOS Advisory Opinion 2-2005. See also Perry v. Pennsylvania, supra. (giving ‘deference’ to this advisory opinion and holding that the term “supervision” as defined by ICAOS “as a matter of statutory construction . . . included the ability to arrest and to detain Plaintiff.”)

Beyond the specific rule authorization, public policy supports the arrest of an out-of-state supervised individual, regardless of the receiving state's domestic law. The ICAOS aims not merely to manage the movement of supervised individuals but to serve vital purposes such as enhancing public safety and safeguarding the rights of crime victims. See INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, ART. I. All activities of the Commission and the member states endeavor to promote these two overriding purposes. Member states, their courts and criminal justice agencies must take all necessary action to “effectuate the Compact’s purposes and intent.” See INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, art. IX, § A.