Compact Online Reference Encyclopedia (CORE)

Looking for information on a specific topic, training, rule, or process? Through one search here, you can find the information you need from ICAOS’ white papersadvisory opinions, bylaws, policies, Hearing Officer's Guidetraining modulesrules, helpdesk articles and the bench book. All results are cross-referenced with links to make navigation easy and intuitive.

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Under the rules of the Commission, a state is not specifically obligated to provide counsel in circumstances of revocation or retaking. However, particularly with regard to revocation proceedings, a state should provide counsel to an indigent supervised…
The ICAOS recognizes that the transfer of supervision (and hence the relocation of an offender) is a matter of privilege subject to the absolute discretion of the sending state and, to a more limited extent, the discretion of the receiving state. Courts…
A supervised individual convicted of a new conviction in the receiving state forming the basis for retaking is not entitled to further hearings, the conviction being conclusive as to the status of the individual’s violations of supervision and the right…
Where the retaking of a supervised individual may result in revocation of conditional release by the sending state, the individual is entitled to the basic due process considerations that are the foundation of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrissey…
Rule 5.108(d) defines the supervised individual’s basic rights for a probable cause hearing. However, each state may have procedural variations. Therefore, to the extent that a hearing officer is unclear on the application of due process procedures in a…
Rule 5.108(e) requires the receiving state to prepare a written report of the hearing within 10 business days and to transmit the report along with any evidence or record from the hearing to the sending state. The report must contain (1) the time, date,…
If the hearing officer determines that probable cause exists and the supervised individual has committed the alleged violations, the receiving state may detain the individual in custody pending the outcome of decisions in the sending state. Within 15…
The supervised individual may waive this hearing only if she or he admits to one or more violations of their supervision. See Rule 5.108(b), also Sanders v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 958 A.2d 582 (2008). Waiving the probable cause…
A supervised individual subject to retaking proceedings has no right to bail. Rule 5.111 specifically prohibits any court or paroling authority in any state from admitting a supervised individual to bail pending completion of the retaking process,…
For purposes of revocation or other punitive action, a sending state is required to give the same force and effect to the violation of a condition imposed by the receiving state as if the condition had been imposed by the sending state. Furthermore, the…
Given the large number of individuals under supervision through the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS, or the Compact), legal actions against judicial officials, correctional staff, and other administrators of the Compact are…
The two principal pathways through which government officers might face legal liability through their work related to ICAOS are (1) federal civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) state law tort claims. Plaintiffs will also sometimes attempt…
One of the primary vehicles through which officials might be sued for their work related to the Compact is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute that creates a cause of action for violations of a person’s civil rights. The statute gives a…
The federal right in question in a Section 1983 action is typically a constitutional right (for example, the right to equal protection under the law or the right to be free from an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States…
While the Compact does not create a private right of action, this does not leave supervised individuals without recourse under Section 1983. Instead, their claims must be framed as violations of constitutionally protected rights. There are numerous…
Acknowledgements The Commission would like to acknowledge the assistance of all the individuals involved in drafting this book and, more specifically, to the authors and reviewers that took part in the review process. Our sincere gratitude goes to the…
Interstate Compacts are not new legal instruments. Compacts derive from the nation’s colonial past where states utilized agreements, like modern Compacts, to resolve inter-colonial disputes, particularly boundary disputes. The colonies and crown employed…
Overview The legal framework governing Compacts encompasses a blend of Compact texts and case law from federal and state courts nationwide. Due to the limited number of court decisions that establish specific legal principles for any given Compact, courts…
Interstate Compacts are binding on signatory states, meaning once a state legislature adopts a Compact, it binds all agencies, state officials and citizens to the terms of that Compact. Since the very first Compact case, the U.S. Supreme Court has…
Beginning with the Articles of Confederation, states used Compacts to settle boundary disputes.  In 1918, Oregon and Washington enacted the first Compact solely devoted to joint supervision of an interstate resource (fishing on the Columbia River). Three…
Understanding the legal nature of an interstate Compact begins with this basic point: interstate Compacts are formal agreements between states that exist simultaneously as both (1) statutory law, and (2) contracts between states. The contractual nature…
An interstate Compact differs fundamentally from a "uniform law" in its nature and application. Unlike uniform laws, which are not contractual in nature, interstate Compacts are binding agreements between states. A state cannot selectively adopt…
Compacts differ from administrative agreements in two principal ways. First, states, as sovereigns, have inherent authority to enact Compacts. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838). Thus, states do not need any express…
One of the axioms of modern government is a state legislature’s ability to delegate rulemaking power to an administrative body. This delegation of authority extends to the creation of an interstate commission through an interstate Compact. See Hess v.…
The ICAOS operates under Congress’ consent in the Crime Control Act of 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution states, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Though a strict reading of the Compact Clause…
Once Congress grants its consent to a Compact, the general view is that it may not be withdrawn. Although the matter has not been resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, two federal circuit courts of appeal have held that congressional consent, once given, is…
Congressional consent can significantly change the nature of an interstate Compact. “[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for…
Because Compacts are statutes and contracts, courts interpret interstate Compacts in the same manner as interpreting ordinary statutes and by applying contract law principles. PRACTICE NOTE: No court has explained when to apply statutory construction…
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