Compact Online Reference Encyclopedia (CORE)

Looking for information on a specific topic, training, rule, or process? Through one search here, you can find the information you need from ICAOS’ white papers, advisory opinions, bylaws, policies, Hearing Officer's Guide, training modules, rules, helpdesk articles and the bench book. All results are cross-referenced with links to make navigation easy and intuitive.

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Bench Book - 1.4 Congressional Consent Requirement
The ICAOS operates under Congress’ consent in the Crime Control Act of 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
Bench Book - 1.4.1 When Consent is Required
The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution states, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Though a strict reading of the Compact Clause…
Bench Book - 1.4.2 Withdrawal and Modification of Congressional Consent
Once Congress grants its consent to a Compact, the general view is that it may not be withdrawn. Although the matter has not been resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, two federal circuit courts of appeal have held that congressional consent, once given, is…
Bench Book - 1.4.3 Implications of Congressional Consent
Congressional consent can significantly change the nature of an interstate Compact. “[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for…
Bench Book - 1.5 Interpretation of Interstate Compacts
Because Compacts are statutes and contracts, courts interpret interstate Compacts in the same manner as interpreting ordinary statutes and by applying contract law principles. PRACTICE NOTE: No court has explained when to apply statutory construction…
Bench Book - 1.6 Application of State Law that Conflicts with an Interstate Compact
Where state law and a Compact conflict, courts are required under the Supremacy Clause (for Compacts with consent) and as a matter of contract law to apply the terms and conditions of the Compact to a given case. The fact that a judge may not like the…
Bench Book - 1.7 Special Considerations for Litigation Involving Interstate Commissions
Special Considerations for Litigation Involving Interstate Commissions
Bench Book - 1.7.1 Relief Must Be Consistent with the Compact
In Texas v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court sustained exceptions to a Special Master’s recommendation to enlarge the Pecos River Compact Commission, holding that one consequence of a Compact becoming “a law of the United States” is that “no court may order…
Bench Book - 1.7.2 Eleventh Amendment Issues for Interstate Commissions
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment ensures that states retain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). Over the…
Bench Book - 5.2.1 Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
One of the primary vehicles through which officials might be sued for their work related to the Compact is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute that creates a cause of action for violations of a person’s civil rights. The statute gives a…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.1 No Statutory Right under ICAOS Itself
The federal right in question in a Section 1983 action is typically a constitutional right (for example, the right to equal protection under the law or the right to be free from an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.2 Constitutional Violations Related to ICAOS
While the Compact does not create a private right of action, this does not leave supervised individuals without recourse under Section 1983. Instead, their claims must be framed as violations of constitutionally protected rights. There are numerous…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.3 No Supervisor Liability under Section 1983
In general, Section 1983 liability will not be predicated solely on a theory of respondeat superior. For example, a chief probation officer or other supervisor or manager will not automatically be deemed vicariously liable simply because he or she sits…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.4 No Substitute for Appeal or Habeas Corpus
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court clarified that a Section 1983 action should not be used to challenge the validity of a criminal judgment. If the alleged civil rights violation would be one that would render a conviction,…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.5 Official Capacity versus Individual Capacity
Plaintiffs can bring Section 1983 actions against defendants in their official capacity or in their individual capacity. Defendants sued in their official capacity will generally be immune from suits for monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment to…
Bench Book - 5.2.1.6 Persons Acting under Color of Law
There is rarely any doubt in the case law that probation and parole officials are “persons” and that, in performing their duties, they are acting under “color of law” within the meaning of Section 1983. The law also allows suits against municipalities and…
Bench Book - 5.2.2 State Tort Claims
In addition to civil rights lawsuits, supervised individuals (and others) sometimes file tort claims related to conduct arising under the Compact. In many cases, some form of immunity will apply, and questions related to immunity will generally turn on…
Bench Book - 5.2.2.1 Tort Claims by Supervised Individuals
Supervised individuals will sometimes allege that officers were negligent in carrying out their duties under the Compact. For example, in Grayson v. Kansas, No. 06-2375-KHV, 2007 WL 1259990, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2007), a probationer transferred under…
Bench Book - 5.2.2.2 Tort Claims by Others
An unfortunate fact pattern that arises from time to time is when a Compact supervised individual causes the injury or death of a victim. Victims of those incidents (or their family members or estate) will sometimes raise tort claims against correctional…
Bench Book - 5.2.3 Claims under the Compact Itself
Some federal statutes have their own enforcement mechanism through an express or implied cause of action in the federal statute itself. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (applying the test through which a court determines whether a statute…
Bench Book - 5.3 Immunity and Related Defenses
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government may not be sued without its consent. The concept flows from the common-law notion that the “the king can do no wrong” and that a lawsuit could not be brought against him in his own courts. Through…
Bench Book - 5.3.1 Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.1 Official Capacity versus Individual Capacity
Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state government officers and employees to the extent that they are sued in their official capacity, but not to suits against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between official-capacity and…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.2 No Protection for Local Governments
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to the political subdivisions of a state (its municipalities and counties) or to the officers and employees of those subdivisions. Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Those…
Bench Book - 5.3.1.3 Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
There are several ways a state might waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. First, immunity can be waived by express state law. It can also be waived by voluntary participation in a federal program that expressly conditions…
Bench Book - 5.3.2 State Sovereign Immunity
State sovereign immunity is, as noted above, the doctrine that prevents a state from being sued in its own courts without its consent. It will generally be a matter of state law, and of course not every state is the same. Many states have narrowed or…
Bench Book - 5.3.3 Immunity in Another State's Courts
Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor other formulations of sovereign immunity bar a suit against a state in the courts of another state. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Mianecki v. Second Judicial Court of Washoe County, 658 P.2d 422 (Nev. 1983),…
Bench Book - 5.3.4 Judicial Immunity
Judges have absolute immunity from liability as long as they are performing a judicial act and there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). A judge is not deprived of absolute immunity from liability for…
Bench Book - 5.3.5 Prosecutorial Immunity
Like judges, prosecutors have absolute immunity from lawsuits seeking monetary damages. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1986). That immunity allows prosecutors to exercise the independence of judgment essential to their work—and to avoid the deluge of…
Bench Book - 5.3.6 Qualified Immunity
Government officials sued in their individual capacity have what is known as qualified immunity from suits for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person…
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